Abstract. We formally study the notion of a joint signature and encryption in the public-key setting. We refer to this primitive as signcryption, adapting the terminology of [35] . We present two de£nitions for the security of signcryption depending on whether the adversary is an outsider or a legal user of the system. We then examine generic sequential composition methods of building signcryption from a signature and encryption scheme. Contrary to what recent results in the symmetric setting [5, 22] might lead one to expect, we show that classical "encrypt-then-sign" (EtS) and "sign-then-encrypt" (StE) methods are both secure composition methods in the public-key setting. We also present a new composition method which we call "commit-then-encryptand-sign" (CtE&S). Unlike the generic sequential composition methods, CtE&S applies the expensive signature and encryption operations in parallel, which could imply a gain in ef£ciency over the StE and EtS schemes. We also show that the new CtE&S method elegantly combines with the recent "hash-sign-switch" technique of [30] , leading to ef£cient on-line/off-line signcryption. Finally and of independent interest, we discuss the de£nitional inadequacy of the standard notion of chosen ciphertext (CCA2) security. We suggest a natural and very slight relaxation of CCA2-security, which we call generalized CCA2-security (gCCA2). We show that gCCA2-security suf£ces for all known uses of CCA2-secure encryption, while no longer suffering from the de£nitional shortcomings of the latter.
Introduction
Signcryption. Encryption and signature schemes are fundamental cryptographic tools for providing privacy and authenticity, respectively, in the public-key setting. Until very recently, they have been viewed as important but distinct basic building blocks of various cryptographic systems, and have been designed and analyzed separately. The separation between the two operations can be seen as a natural one as encryption is aimed at providing privacy while signatures are used to enable authentication, and these are two fundamentally different security goals. Yet clearly, there are many settings where both are needed, perhaps the most basic one is in secure e-mailing, where each message should be authenticated and encrypted. A straightforward solution to offering simultaneously both privacy and authenticity might be to compose the known solutions of each of the two components. But given that the combination of the two security goals is so common, and in fact a basic task, it stands to reason that a tailored solution for the combination should be given. Indeed, a cryptographic tool providing both authenticity and privacy has usually been called an authenticated encryption, but was mainly studied in the symmetric setting [6, 5, 22] . This paper will concentrate on the corresponding study in the public key setting, and will use the term signcryption to refer to a "joint signature and encryption". We remark that this term was originally introduced and studied by Zheng in [35] with the primary goal of reaching greater ef£ciency than when carrying out the signature and encryption operations separately. As we will argue shortly, ef£ciency is only one (albeit important) concern when designing a secure joint signature and encryption. Therefore, we will use the term "signcryption" for any scheme achieving both privacy and authenticity in the public key setting, irrespective of its performance, as long as it satis£es a formal de£nition of security we develop in this paper. Indeed, despite presenting some security arguments, most of the initial work on signcryption [35, 36, 26, 19] lacked formal de£nitions and analysis. This paper will provide such a formal treatment, as well as give new general constructions of signcryption.
Signcryption as a primitive?
Before devoting time to the de£nition and design of (additional) signcryption schemes one must ask if there is a need for de£ning signcryption as a separate primitive. Indeed, maybe one should forgo this notion and always use a simple composition of a signature and encryption? Though we show in the following that these compositions, in many instances, yield the desired properties, we still claim that a separate notion of signcryption is extremely useful. This is due to several reasons. First, under certain de£nitions of security (i.e., so called CCA2-security as explained in Section 8), the straightforward composition of a secure signature and encryption does not necessarily yield a secure signcryption. Second, as we show in Section 3, there are quite subtle issues with respect to signcryption -especially in the public-key setting -which need to be captured in a formal de£nition. Third, there are other interesting constructions for signcryption which do not follow the paradigm of sequentially composing signatures and encryption. Fourth, designing tailored solutions might yield ef£ciency (which was the original motivation of Zheng [35] ). Finally, the usage of signcryption as a primitive might conceptually simplify the design of complex protocols which require both privacy and authenticity.
Summarizing the above discussion, we believe that the study of signcryption as a primitive is important and can lead to very useful, general as well as speci£c, paradigms for achieving privacy and authenticity at the same time.
Our Results. This paper provides a formal treatment of signcryption and analyzes several general constructions for this primitive. In particular, we note that the problem of de£ning signcryption in the public key setting is more involved than the corresponding task in the symmetric setting studied by [5, 22] , due to the asymmetric nature of the former. For example, full-¤edged signcryption needs to be de£ned in the multi-user setting, where some issues with user's identities need to be addressed. In contrast, authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting can be fully de£ned in a simpler two-user setting. Luckily, we show that it suf£ces to design and analyze signcryption schemes in the two-user setting as well, by giving a generic transformation to the multi-user setting.
We give two de£nitions for security of signcryption depending on whether the adversary is an outsider or a legal user of the network (i.e., either the sender or the receiver). In both of these settings, we show that the common "encrypt-then-sign" (EtS) and "sign-then-encrypt" (StE) methods in fact yield a secure signcryption, provided an appropriate de£nition of security is used. Moreover, when the adversary is an outsider, these composition methods can actually provide stronger privacy or authenticity properties for the resulting signcryption scheme than the assumed security properties on the base encryption or signature scheme. Speci£cally, the security of the base signature scheme can help amplify the privacy of EtS, while the security of the base encryption scheme can do the same to the authenticity of StE. We remark that these possibly "expected" results are nevertheless somewhat surprising in light of recent "negative" indications from the symmetric setting [5, 22] , and illustrate the need for rigorous de£-nitions for security of signcryption.
In addition, we present a novel construction of signcryption, which we call "committhen-encrypt-and-sign" (CtE&S). Our scheme is a general way to construct signcryption from any signature and encryption schemes, while utilizing in addition a commitment scheme. This method is quite different from the obvious sequential composition paradigm. Moreover, unlike the previous sequential methods, the CtE&S method applies the expensive signature and encryption operations in parallel, which could imply a gain in ef£ciency. We also show that our construction naturally leads to a very ef£-cient way to implement off-line signcryption, where the sender can prepare most of the authenticated ciphertext in advance and perform very little on-line computation.
Finally and of independent interest, we discuss the de£nitional inadequacy of the standard notion of chosen ciphertext (CCA2) security [13, 4] . Motivated by our applications to signcryption, we show that the notion of CCA2-security is syntactically illde£ned, and leads to arti£cial examples of "intuitively CCA2-secure" schemes which do not meet the formal de£nition (such observations were also made by [8, 9] ). We suggest a natural and very slight relaxation of CCA2-security, which we call generalized CCA2-security (gCCA2). We show that gCCA2-security suf£ces for all known uses of CCA2-secure encryption, while no longer suffering from the de£nitional shortcomings of the latter.
Related Work. The initial works on signcryption [35, 36, 26, 19] designed several signcryption schemes, whose "security" was informally based on various number-theoretic assumptions. Only recently (and independently of our work) Baek et al. [3] showed that the original scheme of Zheng [35] (based on shortened ElGamal signatures) can be shown secure in the random oracle model under the gap Dif£e-Hellman assumption.
We also mention the works of [34, 29] , which used Schnorr signature to amplify the security of ElGamal encryption to withstand a chosen ciphertext attack. However, the above works concentrate on providing privacy, and do not provide authenticity, as required by our notion of signcryption.
Recently, much work has been done about authenticated encryption in the symmetric (private-key) setting. The £rst formalizations of authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting were done by [21, 6, 5] . The works of [5, 22] discuss the security of generic composition methods of a (symmetric) encryption and a message authentication code (MAC). In particular, a lot of emphasis in these works is given to the study of suf£cient conditions under which a given composition method can amplify (rather than merely preserve) the privacy property of a given composition method from the chosen plaintext (CPA) to the chosen ciphertext (CCA2) level. From this perspective, the "encrypt-then-mac" method -which always achieves such an ampli£cation due to a "strongly unforgeable" MAC -was found generically preferable to the "macthen-encrypt" method, which does so only in speci£c (albeit very useful) cases [22] . In contrast, An and Bellare [1] study a symmetric question of under which conditions a "good" privacy property on the base encryption scheme can help amplify the authenticity property in the "mac-then-encrypt" (or "encrypt-with-redundancy") method. On a positive side, they found that chosen ciphertext security on the base encryption scheme is indeed suf£cient for that purpose. As we shall see in Section 4, all these results are very related to our results about "sign-then-encrypt" and "encrypt-then-sign" methods for signcryption when the adversary is an "outsider".
Another related paradigm for building authenticated encryption is the "encode-thenencipher" method of [6] : add randomness and redundancy, and then encipher (i.e., apply a pseudorandom permutation) rather than encrypt. Even though a strong pseudorandom permutation is often more expensive than encryption, [6] shows that very simple public redundancy functions are suf£cient -in contrast to the "encrypt-with-redundancy" method, where no public redundancy can work [1] .
Finally, we mention recently designed modes of operations for block ciphers that achieve both privacy and authenticity in the symmetric setting: RFC mode of [21] , IACBC and IAPM modes of [20] , OCB mode of [28] , and SNCBC mode of [1] .
De£nitions
In this section we brie¤y review the (public-key) notions of encryption, signature and commitment schemes. In addition, we present our extended de£nition for CCA2.
Encryption
Syntax. An encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: E = (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec). Enc-Gen(1 k ), where k is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (EK, DK). EK is the encryption key, which is made public, and DK is the decryption key which is kept secret. The randomized encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a key EK and a message m from the associated message space M, and internally ¤ips some coins and outputs a ciphertext e; we write e ← Enc EK (m). For brevity, we will usually omit EK and write e ← Enc(m). The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes as input the ciphertext e, the secret key DK, and outputs some message m ∈ M, or ⊥ in case e was "invalid". We write m ← Dec(e) (again, omitting DK). We require that Dec(Enc(m)) = m, for any m ∈ M.
Security of Encryption.
When addressing the security of the schemes, we deal with two issues: what we want to achieve (security goal) and what are the capabilities of the adversary (attack model). In this paper we will talk about the most common security goal: indistinguishability of ciphertexts [16] , which we will denote by IND. A related notion of non-malleability will be brie¤y discussed in Section 8.
Intuitively, indistinguishability means that given a randomly selected public key, no PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary A can distinguish encryptions of any two messages m 0 , m 1 chosen by A: Enc(m 0 ) ≈ Enc(m 1 ). Formally, we require that for any PPT A, which runs in two stages, find and guess, we have
Here and elsewhere negl(k) is some negligible function in the security parameter k, and α is some internal state information A saves and uses in the two stages. We now turn to the second issue of security of encryption -the attack model. We consider three types of attack: CPA, CCA1 and CCA2. Under the chosen plaintext (or CPA) attack, the adversary is not given any extra capabilities other than encrypting messages using the public encryption key. A more powerful type of chosen ciphertext attack gives A access to the decryption oracle, namely the ability to decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts of its choice. The £rst of this type of attack is the lunch-time (CCA1) attack [27] , which gives access only in the find stage (i.e., before the challenge ciphertext e is given). The second is CCA2 on which we elaborate in the following.
CCA2 Attacks. The adaptive chosen ciphertext attack [13] (CCA2) gives access to the decryption oracle in the guess stage as well. As stated, the CCA2 attack does not make sense since A can simply ask to decrypt the challenge e. Therefore, we need to restrict the class of ciphertexts e that A can give to the decryption oracle in the guess stage. The minimal restriction is to have e = e, which is the way the CCA2 attack is usually de£ned. As we will argue in Section 8, stopping at this minimal (and needed) restriction in turn restricts the class of encryption schemes that we intuitively view as being "secure". In particular, it is not robust to syntactic changes in the encryption (e.g., appending a harmless random bit to a secure encryption suddenly makes it "insecure" against CCA2). Leaving further discussion to Section 8, we now de£ne a special case of the CCA2 attack which does not suffer from the above syntactic limitations and suf£ces for all the uses of the CCA2-secure encryption we are aware of.
We £rst generalize the CCA2 attack with respect to some equivalence relation R(·, ·) on the ciphertexts. R is de£ned as part of the encryption scheme, it can depend on the public key EK, but must have the following property: if R(e 1 , e 2 ) = true ⇒ Dec(e 1 ) = Dec(e 2 ). We call such R decryption-respecting. Now A is forbidden to ask any e equivalent to e, i.e. R(e, e ) = true. Since R is re¤exive, this at least rules out e, and since R is decryption-respecting, it only restricts ciphertexts that decrypt to the same value as the decryption of e (i.e. m b ). We note that the usual CCA2 attack corresponds to the equality relation. Now we say that the encryption scheme is secure against generalized CCA2 (or gCCA2) if there exists some ef£cient decryption-respecting relation R w.r.t. which it is CCA2-secure. For example, appending a harmless bit to gCCA2-secure encryption or doing other easily recognizable manipulation still leaves it gCCA2-secure.
We remark that the notion of gCCA2-security was recently proposed in [32] (under the name benign malleability) for the ISO public key encryption standard. In the privatekey setting, [22] uses equivalences relations to de£ne "loose ciphertext unforgeability".
Signatures
Syntax. A signature scheme consists of three algorithms: S = (Sig-Gen, Sig, Ver). Sig-Gen(1 k ), where k is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (SK, VK). SK is the signing key, which is kept secret, and VK is the veri£cation key which is made public. The randomized signing algorithm Sig takes as input a key SK and a message m from the associated message space M, internally ¤ips some coins and outputs a signature s; we write s ← Sig SK (m). We will usually omit SK and write s ← Sig(m).
Wlog, we will assume that the message m can be determined from the signature s (e.g., is part of it), and write m = Msg(s) to denote the message whose signature is s. The deterministic veri£cation algorithm Ver takes as input the signature s, the public key VK, and outputs the answer a which is either succeed (signature is valid) or fail (signature is invalid). We write a ← Ver(s) (again, omitting VK). We require that Ver(Sig(m)) = succeed, for any m ∈ M.
Security of Signatures.
As with the encryption, the security of signatures addresses two issues: what we want to achieve (security goal) and what are the capabilities of the adversary (attack model). In this paper we will talk about the the most common security goal: existential unforgeability [17] , denoted by UF. This means that any PPT adversary A should have a negligible probability of generating a valid signature of a "new" message. To clarify the meaning of "new", we will consider the following two attack models. In the no message attack (NMA), A gets no help besides VK. In the chosen message attack (CMA), in addition to VK, the adversary A gets full access to the signing oracle Sig, i.e. A is allowed to query the signing oracle to obtain valid signatures s 1 , . . . , s n of arbitrary messages m 1 , . . . , m n adaptively chosen by A (notice, NMA corresponds to n = 0). Naturally, A is considered successful only if it forges a valid signature s of a message m not queried to signing oracle: m ∈ {m 1 . . . m n }. We denote the resulting security notions by UF-NMA and UF-CMA, respectively.
We also mention a slightly stronger type of unforgeability called strong unforgeability, denoted sUF. Here A should not only be unable to generate a signature of a "new" message, but also be unable to generate even a different signature of an already signed message, i.e. s ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s n }. This only makes sense for the CMA attack, and results in a security notion we denote by sUF-CMA.
Commitment
Syntax. A (non-interactive) commitment scheme consists of three algorithms: C = (Setup, Commit, Open). The setup algorithm Setup(1 k ), where k is the security parameter, outputs a public commitment key CK (possibly empty, but usually consisting of public parameters for the commitment scheme). Given a message m from the associated message space M (e.g., {0, 1} k ), Commit CK (m; r) (computed using the public key CK and additional randomness r) produces a commitment pair (c, d), where c is the commitment to m and d is the decommitment. We will usually omit CK and write (c, d) ← Commit(m). Sometimes we will write c(m) (resp. d(m)) to denote the commitment (resp. decommitment) part of a randomly generated (c, d). The last (deterministic) algorithm Open CK (c, d) outputs m if (c, d) is a valid pair for m (i.e. could have been generated by Commit(m)), or ⊥ otherwise. We require that Open(Commit(m)) = m for any m ∈ M.
Security of Commitment. Regular commitment schemes have two security properties:
Hiding. No PPT adversary can distinguish the commitments to any two message of its choice: c(m 1 ) ≈ c(m 2 ). That is, c(m) reveals "no information" about m. Formally, for any PPT A which runs in two stages, find and guess, we have Relaxed commitments. We will also consider relaxed commitment schemes, where the (strict) binding property above is replaced by the Relaxed Binding property: for any PPT adversary A, having the knowledge of CK, it is computationally hard for A to come up with a message m, such that when (c, d) ← Commit(m) is generated, A(c, d, CK) produces, with non-negligible probability, a value d such that (c, d ) is a valid commitment to some m = m. Namely, A cannot £nd a collision using a randomly generated c(m), even for m of its choice.
To justify this distinction, £rst recall the concepts of collision-resistant hash function (CRHF) families and universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) families. For both concepts, it is hard to £nd a colliding pair x = x such that H(x) = H(x ), where H is a function randomly chosen from the corresponding family. However, with CRHF, we £rst select the function H, and for UOWHF the adversary has to select x before H is given to it. By the result of Simon [33] , UOWHF's are strictly weaker primitive than CRHF (in particular, they can be built from regular one-way functions [24] ). We note two classical results about (regular) commitment schemes: the construction of such a scheme by [11, 18] , and the folklore "hash-then-commit" paradigm (used for committing to long messages by hashing them £rst). Both of these results require the use of CRHF's, and it is easy to see that UOWHF's are not suf£cient to ensure (strict) binding for either one of them. On the other hand, it is not very hard to see that UOWHF's suf£ce to ensure relaxed binding in both cases. Hence, basing some construction on relaxed commitments (as we will do in Section 5) has its merits over regular commitments.
Trapdoor Commitments. We also de£ne a very useful class of commitment schemes, known as (non-interactive) trapdoor commitments [7] or chameleon hash functions [23] . In these schemes the setup algorithm Setup(1 k ) outputs a pair of keys (CK, TK). That is, in addition to the public commitment key CK, it also produces a trapdoor key TK. Like regular commitments, trapdoor commitments satisfy the hiding property and (possibly relaxed) binding properties. Additionally, they have an ef£cient switching algorithm Switch, which allows one to £nd arbitrary collisions using the trapdoor key TK.
Given any commitment (c, d) to some message m and any message m , Switch TK ((c, d), m ) outputs a valid commitment pair (c, d ) to m (note, c is the same!). Moreover, having the knowledge of CK, it is computationally hard to come up with two messages m, m such that the adversary can distinguish Commit CK (m ) (random commitment pair for m ) from Switch TK (Commit CK (m), m ) (faked commitment pair for m obtained from a random pair for m).
We note that the trapdoor collisions property is much stronger (and easily implies) the hiding property (since the switching algorithm does not change c(m)). Moreover, the hiding property is information-theoretic. We also note that very ef£cient trapdoor commitment schemes exist based on factoring [23, 30] or discrete log [23, 7] . In particular, the switching function requires just one modulo addition and one modulo multiplication for the discrete log based solution. Less ef£cient constructions based on more general assumptions are known as well [23] .
De£nition of Signcryption in the Two-user Setting
The de£nition of signcryption is a little bit more involved than the corresponding definition of authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting. Indeed, in the symmetric setting, we only have one speci£c pair of users who (1) share a single key; (2) trust each other; (3) "know who they are"; and (4) care about being protected from "the rest of the world". In contrast, in the public key setting each user independently publishes its public keys, after which it can send/receive messages to/from any other user. In particular, (1) each user should have an explicit identity (i.e., its public key); (2) each signcryption has to explicitly contain the (presumed) identities of the sender S and the receiver R; (3) each user should be protected from every other user. This suggests that signcryption should be de£ned in the multi-user setting. Luckily, we show that we can £rst de£ne and study the crucial properties of signcryption in the stand-alone two-user setting, and then add identities to our de£nitions and constructions to achieve the full-¤edged multiuser security. Thus, in this section we start with a simple two-user setting, postponing the extension to multi-user setting to Section 7.
Syntax. A signcryption scheme SC consists of three algorithms: SC = (Gen, SigEnc, VerDec). The algorithm Gen(1 k ), where k is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (SDK, VEK). SDK is the user's sign/decrypt key, which is kept secret, and VEK the user's verify/encrypt key, which is made public. Note, that in the signcryption setting all participating parties need to invoke Gen. For a user P , denote its keys by SDK P and VEK P . The randomized signcryption (sign/encrypt) algorithm SigEnc takes as input the sender S's secret key SDK S and the receiver R's public key VEK R and a message m from the associated message space M, and internally ¤ips some coins and outputs a signcryption (ciphertext) u; we write u ← SigEnc(m) (omitting SDK S , VEK R ). The deterministic de-signcryption (verify/decrypt) algorithm VerDec takes as input the signcryption (ciphertext) e, the receiver R's secret key SDK R and the sender S's public key VEK S , and outputs m ∈ M ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ indicates that the message was not encrypted or signed properly. We write m ← VerDec(u) (again, omitting the keys). We require that VerDec(SigEnc(m)) = m, for any m ∈ M.
Security of Signcryption. Fix the sender S and the receiver R. Intuitively, we would like to say that S's authenticity is protected, and R's privacy is protected. We will give two formalizations of this intuition. The £rst one assumes that the adversary A is an outsider who only knows the public information pub = (VEK R , VEK S ). We call such security Outsider security. The second, stronger notion, protects S's authenticity even against R, and R's privacy even against S. Put in other words, it assumes that the adversary A is a legal user of the system. We call such security Insider security.
Outsider Security. We de£ne it against the strongest security notions on the signature (analogs of UF-CMA or sUF-CMA) and encryption (analogs of IND-gCCA2 or IND-CCA2), and weaker notions could easily be de£ned as well. We assume that the adversary A has the public information pub = (VEK S , VEK R ). It also has oracle access to the functionalities of both S and R. Speci£cally, it can mount a chosen message attack on S by asking S to produce signcryption u of an arbitrary message m. In other words, A has access to the signcryption oracle. Similarly, it can mount a chosen ciphertext attack on R by giving R any candidate signcryption u and receiving back the message m (where m could be ⊥), i.e. A has access to the de-signcryption oracle. Notice, A cannot by itself run either the signcryption or the de-signcryption oracles due to the lack of corresponding secret keys SDK S and SDK R .
To break the UF-CMA security of the signcryption scheme, A has to come up with a valid signcryption u of a "new" message m, which it did not ask S to signcrypt earlier (notice, A is not required to "know" m when producing u). The scheme is Outsidersecure in the UF-CMA sense if any PPT A has a negligible chance of succeeding. (For sUF-CMA, A only has to produce u which was not returned by S earlier. ) To break the indistinguishability of the signcryption scheme, A has to come up with two messages m 0 and m 1 . One of these will be signcrypted at random, the corresponding signcryption u will be given to A, and A has to guess which message was signcrypted. To succeed in the CCA2 attack, A is only disallowed to ask R to de-signcrypt the challenge u. For gCCA2 attack, similarly to the encryption scenario, we £rst de£ne CCA2 attack against a given ef£cient decryption-respecting relation R (which could depend on pub = (VEK R , VEK S ) but not on any of the secret keys). As before, decryption-respecting means that R(u, u ) = true ⇒ VerDec(u) = VerDec(u ). Thus, CCA2 attack w.r.t. R disallows A to de-signcrypt any u equivalent to the challenge u. Now, for Outsider-security against CCA2 w.r.t. R, we require Pr[A succeeds] ≤ 1 2 + negl(k). Finally, the scheme is Outsider-secure in the IND-gCCA2 sense if it is Outsider-secure against CCA2 w.r.t. some ef£cient decryption-respecting R.
Insider Security. We could de£ne Insider security in a similar manner by de£ning the capabilities of A and its goals. However, it is much easier to use already existing security notions for signature and encryption schemes. Moreover, this will capture the intuition that "signcryption = signature + encryption". More precisely, given any signcryption scheme SC = (Gen, SigEnc, VerDec), we de£ne the corresponding induced signature scheme S = (Sig-Gen, Sig, Ver) and encryption scheme E = (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec).
-Signature S. The generation algorithm Sig-Gen runs Gen(1 k ) twice to produce two key pairs (SDK S , VEK S ) and (SDK R , VEK R ). Let pub = {VEK S , VEK R } be the public information. We set the signing key to SK = {SDK S , pub}, and the veri£cation key to VK = {SDK R , pub}. Namely, the public veri£cation key (available to the adversary) contains the secret key of the receiver R. To sign a message m, Sig(m) outputs u = SigEnc(m), while the veri£cation algorithm Ver(u) runs m ← VerDec(u) and outputs succeed iff m = ⊥. We note that the veri£cation is indeed polynomial time since VK includes SDK R .
-Encryption E. The generation algorithm Enc-Gen runs Gen(1 k ) twice to produce two key pairs (SDK S , VEK S ) and (SDK R , VEK R ). Let pub = {VEK S , VEK R } be the public information. We set the encryption key to EK = {SDK S , pub}, and the decryption key to DK = {SDK R , pub}. Namely, the public encryption key (available to the adversary) contains the secret key of the sender S. To encrypt a message m, Enc(m) outputs u = SigEnc(m), while the decryption algorithm Dec(u) simply outputs VerDec(u). We note that the encryption is indeed polynomial time since EK includes SDK S .
We say that the signcryption is Insider-secure against the corresponding attack (e.g. gCCA2/CMA) on the privacy/authenticity property, if the corresponding induced encryption/signature is secure against the same attack. 1 We will aim to satisfy INDgCCA2-security for encryption, and UF-CMA-security for signatures.
Should we Require Non-Repudiation?
We note that the conventional notion of digital signatures supports non-repudiation. Namely, the receiver R of a correctly generated signature s of the message m can hold the sender S responsible to the contents of m. Put differently, s is unforgeable and publicly veri£able. On the other hand, non-repudiation does not automatically follow from the de£nition of signcryption. Signcryption only allows the receiver to be convinced that m was sent by S, but does not necessarily enable a third party to verify this fact.
We believe that non-repudiation should not be part of the de£nition of signcryption security, but we will point out which of our schemes achieves it. Indeed, non-repudiation might be needed in some applications, while explicitly undesirable in others (e.g., this issue is the essence of undeniable [10] and chameleon [23] signature schemes).
Insider vs. Outsider security. We illustrate some of the differences between Insider and Outsider security. For example, Insider-security for authenticity implies non-repudiation "in principle". Namely, non-repudiation is certain at least when the receiver R is willing to reveal its secret key SDK R (since this induces a regular signature scheme), or may be possible by other means (like an appropriate zero-knowledge proof). In contrast, Outsider-security leaves open the possibility that R can generate -using its secret key -valid signcryptions of messages that were not actually sent by S. In such a case, non-repudiation cannot be achieved no matter what R does.
Despite the above issues, however, it might still seem that the distinction between Insider-and Outsider-security is a bit contrived, especially for privacy. Intuitively, the Outsider-security protects the privacy of R when talking to S from outside intruders, who do not know the secret key of S. On the other hand, Insider-security assumes that the sender S is the intruder attacking the privacy of R. But since S is the only party that can send valid signcryptions from S to R, this seems to make little sense. Similarly for authenticity, if non-repudiation is not an issue, then Insider-security seems to make little sense; as it assumes that R is the intruder attacking the authenticity of S, and simultaneously the only party that needs to be convinced of the authenticity of the (received) data. And, indeed, in many settings Outsider-security might be all one needs for privacy and/or authenticity. Still, there are some cases where the extra strength of the Insider-security might be important. We give just one example. Assume an adversary A happens to steal the key of S. Even though now A can send fake messages "from S to R", we still might not want A to understand previous (or even future) recorded signcryptions sent from honest S to R. Insider-security will guarantee this fact, while the Outsider-security might not.
Finally, we note that achieving Outsider-security could be signi£cantly easier than Insider-security. One such example will be seen in Theorems 2 and 3. Other exam-ples are given in [2] , who show that authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting could be used to build Outsider-secure signcryption which is not Insider-secure. To summarize, one should carefully examine if one really needs the extra guarantees of Insider-security.
Two Sequential Compositions of Encryption and Signature
In this section, we will discuss two methods of constructing signcryption schemes that are based on sequential generic composition of encryption and signature: encrypt-thensign (EtS) and sign-then-encrypt (StE).
Syntax. Let
and sets VEK = (VK, EK), SDK = (SK, DK). To describe the signcryptions from sender S to receiver R more compactly, we use the shorthands Sig S (·), Enc R (·), Ver S (·) and Dec R (·) indicating whose keys are used but omitting which speci£c keys are used, since the latter is obvious (indeed, Sig S always uses SK S , Enc R -EK R , Ver S -VK S and Dec R -DK R ). Now, we de£ne "encrypt-then-sign" scheme EtS by u ← SigEnc(m; (SK S , EK R )) = Sig S (Enc R (m)). To de-signcrypt u, we letm = Dec R (Msg(u)) provided Ver S (u) = succeed, andm = ⊥ otherwise. We then de£ne VerDec(u; (DK R , VK S )) =m. Notice, we do not mention (EK S , DK S ) and (SK R , VK R ), since they are not used to send the message from S to R. Similarly, we de£ne "sign-then-encrypt" scheme StE by u ← SigEnc(m; (SK S , EK R )) = Enc R (Sig S (m)). To de-signcrypt u, we let s = Dec R (u), and setm = Msg(s) provided Ver S (s) = succeed, andm = ⊥ otherwise. We then de£ne VerDec(u; (DK R , VK S )) =m.
Insider-security. We now show that both EtS and StE are secure composition paradigms. That is, they preserve (in terms of Insider-security) or even improve (in terms of Outsidersecurity) the security properties of E and S. We start with Insider-security.
Theorem 1.
If E is IND-gCCA2-secure, and S is UF-CMA-secure, then EtS and StE are both IND-gCCA2-secure and UF-CMA-secure in the Insider-security model.
The proof of this result is quite simple (and is omitted due to space limitations). However, we remark the crucial use of gCCA2-security when proving the security of EtS. Indeed, we can call two signcryptions u 1 and u 2 equivalent for EtS, if each u i is a valid signature (w.r.t. S) of e i = Msg(u i ), and e 1 and e 2 are equivalent (e.g., equal) w.r.t. to the equivalence relation of E. In other words, a different signature of the same encryption clearly corresponds to the same message, and we should not reward the adversary for achieving such a trivial 2 task.
Remark 1.
We note that StE achieves non-repudiation. On the other hand, EtS might not achieve obvious non-repudiation, except for some special cases. One such important case concerns encryption schemes, where the decryptor can reconstruct the randomness r used by the encryptor. In this case, presenting r such that Enc R (m; r) = e, and u is a valid signature of e yields non-repudiation.
We note that, for the Insider-security in the public-key setting, we cannot hope to amplify the security of the "base" signature or encryption, unlike the symmetric setting, where a proper use of a MAC allows one to increase the privacy from CPA to CCA2-security (see [5, 22] ). For example, in the Insider-security for encryption, the adversary is acting as the sender and holds the signing key. Thus, it is obvious that the use of this signing key cannot protect the receiver and increase the quality of the encryption. Similar argument holds for signatures. Thus, the result of Theorem 1 is the most optimistic we can hope for in that it at least preserves the security of the base signature and encryption, while simultaneously achieving both functionalities.
Outsider-security. On the other hand, we show that in the weaker Outsider-security model, it is possible to amplify the security of encryption using signatures, as well as the security of signatures using encryption, exactly like in the symmetric setting [5, 22, 1] . This shows that Outsider-security model is quite similar to the symmetric setting: namely, from the adversarial point of view the sender and the receiver "share" the secret key (SDK S , SDK R ).
Theorem 2.
If E is IND-CPA-secure, and S is UF-CMA-secure, then EtS is INDgCCA2-secure in the Outsider-and UF-CMA-secure in the Insider-security models.
We omit the proof due to space limitations. Intuitively, either the de-signcryption oracle always returns ⊥ to the gCCA2-adversary, in which case it is "useless" and IND-CPA-security of E is enough, or the adversary can submit a valid signcryption u = Sig(Enc(·)) to this oracle, in which case it breaks the UF-CMA-security of the "outside" signature S.
Theorem 3.
If E is IND-gCCA2-secure, and S is UF-NMA-secure, then StE is INDgCCA2-secure in the Insider-and UF-CMA-secure in the Outsider-security models.
We omit the proof due to space limitations. Intuitively, the IND-gCCA2-security of the "outside" encryption E makes the CMA attack of UF-CMA-adversary A "useless", by effectively hiding the signatures corresponding to A's queried messages, hence making the attack reduced to NMA.
Parallel Encrypt and Sign
So far we concentrated on two basic sequential composition methods, "encrypt-thensign" and "sign-then-encrypt". Another natural generic composition method would be to both encrypt the message and sign the message, denoted E&S. This operation simply outputs a pair (s, e), where s ← Sig S (m) and e ← Enc R (m). One should observe that E&S preserves the authenticity property but obviously does not preserve the privacy of the message as the signature s might reveal information about the message m. Moreover, if the adversary knows that m ∈ {m 0 , m 1 } (as is the case for IND-security), it can see if s is a signature of m 0 or m 1 , thus breaking IND-security. This simple observation was also made by [5, 22] . However, we would like to stress that this scheme has a great advantage: it allows one to parallelize the expensive public key operations, which could imply signi£cant ef£ciency gains. Thus, the question which arises is under which conditions can we design a secure signcryption scheme which would also yield itself to ef£ciency improvements such as parallelization of operations. More concretely, there is no reason why we should apply Enc R and Sig S to m itself. What if we apply some ef£cient "pre-processing" transformation T to the message m, which produces a pair (c, d), and then sign c and encrypt d in parallel? Under which conditions on T will this yield a secure signcryption? Somewhat surprisingly, we show a very general result: instantiating T as a commitment scheme would enable us to both achieve a signcryption scheme and parallelize the expensive public key operations. More precisely, relaxed commitment is necessary and suf£cient! In the following we explain this result in more detail.
Syntax. Clearly, the values (c, d) produced by T (m) should be such that m is recoverable from (c, d), But which exactly the syntax (but not yet the security) of a commitment scheme, as de£ned in Section 2.3. Namely, T could be viewed as the message commitment algorithm Commit, while the message recovery algorithm is the opening algorithm Open, and we want Open(Commit(m)) = m. For a technical reason, we will also assume there exists at most one valid c for every value of d. This is done without loss of generally when commitment schemes are used. Indeed, essentially all commitment schemes have, and can always be assumed to have, d = (m, r), where r is the randomness of Commit(m), and Open(c, (m, r)) just checks if Commit(m; r) = (c, (m, r)) before outputting m. Now, given any such (possibly insecure) C = (Setup, Commit, Open), an encryption scheme E = (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec) and a signature scheme S = (Sig-Gen, Sig, Ver), we de£ne a new composition paradigm, which we call "commit-then-encrypt-and-sign": shortly, CtE&S = (Gen, SigEnc, VerDec). For simplicity, we assume for now that all the participants share the same common commitment key CK (e.g., generated by a trusted party). Gen(1 k ) is the same as for EtS and StE compositions: set VEK = (VK, EK), SDK = (SK, DK). Now, to signcrypt a message m from S to R, the sender S £rst runs (c, d) ← Commit(m), and outputs signcryption u = (s, e), where s ← Sig S (c) and e ← Enc R (d). Namely, we sign the commitment c and encrypt the decommitment d. To de-signcrypt, the receiver R validates c = Msg(s) using Ver S (s) and decrypts d = Dec R (e) (outputting ⊥ if either fails). The £nal output ism = Open(c, d). Obviously,m = m if everybody is honest.
Main Result. We have de£ned the new composition paradigm CtE&S based purely on the syntactic properties of C, E and S. Now we formulate which security properties of C are necessary and suf£cient so that our signcryption CtE&S preserves the security of E and S. As in Section 4, we concentrate on UF-CMA and IND-gCCA2 security. Our main result is as follows: 
Conversely, assume C satis£es the hiding property, and let R be the decryptionrespecting equivalence relation w.r.t. which E is IND-CCA2-secure. We let the equivalence relation R for E be R ((c 1 , e 1 ) , (c 2 , e 2 )) = true iff R(e 1 , e 2 ) = true and c 1 = c 2 . It is easy to see that R is decryption-respecting, since if
We now show IND-CCA2-security of E w.r.t. R . For that, let Env 1 denote the usual environment where we place any adversary A for E . Namely, (1) in find Env 1 honestly answers the decryption queries of A ; (2) after m 0 and m 1 are selected, Env 1 picks a random b,
3) in guess, Env 1 honestly answers decryption query e = (c, e) provided R (e ,ẽ) = f alse. We can assume that A never asks a query (c, e) where R(e, e b ) = true but c = c b . Indeed, by our assumption only the value c = c b will check with d b , so the answer to queries with c = c b is ⊥ (and A knows it). Hence, we can assume that R (e ,ẽ) = f alse implies that R (e, e b ) = f alse. We let Succ 1 (A ) denote the probability A succeeds in predicting b. Then, we de£ne the following "fake" environment Env 2 . It is identical to Env 1 above, except for one aspect: in step (2) it would return bogus encryptionẽ = (c(0), e b ), i.e. puts the commitment to the zero string 0 instead of the expected c b . In particular, step (3) is the same as before with the understanding that R (e ,ẽ) is evaluated with the fake challengeẽ. We let Succ 2 (A ) be the success probability of A in Env 2 .
We make two claims: (a) using the hiding property of C, no PPT adversary A can distinguish Env 1 from Env 2 , i.e. |Succ 1 (A ) − Succ 2 (A )| ≤ negl(k); (b) using INDgCCA2-security of E, Succ 2 (A ) < 
Proof of Claim (a).
If for some A , Succ 1 (A )−Succ 2 (A ) > ε for non-negligible ε, we create A 1 that will break the hiding property of C. A 1 picks (EK, DK) ← Enc-Gen(1 k ) by itself, and runs A (answering its decryption queries using DK) until A outputs m 0 and m 1 . At this stage A 1 picks a random b ← {0, 1}, and claims to be able to distinguish c(0) from c b = c(m b ). When presented withc -a commitment to either 0 or m b -A 1 will return to A the "ciphertext"ẽ = (c, e b ). A 1 will then again run A to completion refusing to decrypt e such that R (e ,ẽ) = true. (c(0), e b ) . Then, again, A 2 uses its own decryption oracle to answer all queries e = (c, e) as long as R (e ,ẽ) = f alse. From the de£nition of R and our assumption earlier, we see that R(e, e b ) = f alse as well, so all such queries are legal. Since A 2 exactly recreates the environment Env 2 for A , A 2 succeeds with probability Succ 2 (A ) > 1 2 + ε. We note that the £rst part of Theorem 4 follows using exactly the same proof as Lemma 1. Only few small changes (omitted) are needed due to the fact that the commitment is now signed. We remark only that IND-gCCA2 security is again important here. Informally, IND-gCCA2-security is robust to easily recognizable and invertible changes of the ciphertext. Thus, signing the commitment part -which is polynomially veri£able -does not spoil IND-gCCA2-security.
We now move to the second lemma. We de£ne auxiliary signature scheme S = (Sig-Gen , Sig , Ver ) as follows: (1 Conversely, assume some forger A breaks the UF-CMA-security of S with nonnegligible probability ε. Assume A made (wlog exactly) t = t(k) oracle queries to Sig for some polynomial t(k). For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we let m i be the i-th message A asked to sign, and (s i , d i ) be its signature (where (c i , d i ) ← Commit(m i ) and s i ← Sig(c i )). We also let m, s, d, c have similar meaning for the message that A forged. Finally, let Forged denote the event that c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c t }. Notice, ε < Pr(A succeeds) = Pr(A succeeds ∧ Forged) + Pr(A succeeds ∧ Forged) Thus, at least one of the probabilities above is ≥ ε/2. We show that the £rst case contradicts the UF-CMA-security of S, while the second case contradicts the relaxed binding property of C.
